Three Words and the Future of the Affordable Care Act by Bagley, Nicholas
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
2015
Three Words and the Future of the Affordable Care
Act
Nicholas Bagley
University of Michigan Law School, nbagley@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1676
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Insurance Law Commons, Law and Politics
Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bagley, Nicholas. "Three Words and the Future of the Affordable Care Act." J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 40, no. 3 (2015): 589-97.
Three Words and the Future
of the Affordable Care Act
Nicholas Bagley
University of Michigan
Editor’s Note: JHPPL has started an ACA Scholar-Practitioner Network
(ASPN). The ASPN assembles people of different backgrounds (practi-
tioners, stakeholders, and researchers) involved in state-level health
reform implementation across the United States. The newly developed
ASPN website documents ACA implementation research projects to assist
policy makers, researchers, and journalists in identifying and integrating
scholarly work on state-level implementation of the ACA. If you would like
your work included on the ASPN website, please contact web coordina-
tor Phillip Singer at pmsinger@umich.edu. You can visit the site at
//ssascholars.uchicago.edu/jhppl/.
JHPPL seeks to bring this important and timely work to the fore in
Report on Health Reform Implementation, a recurring special section.
Thanks to funding from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, all essays
in the section are published open access.
—Colleen M. Grogan
Abstract As an essential part of its effort to achieve near universal coverage, the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) extends sizable tax credits to most people who buy
insurance on the newly established health care exchanges. Yet several lawsuits have
been filed challenging the availability of those tax credits in the thirty-four states that
refused to set up their own exchanges. The lawsuits are premised on a strained inter-
pretation of the ACA that, if accepted, would make a hash of other provisions of the
statute and undermine its effort to extend coverage to the uninsured. The courts should
reject this latest effort to dismantle a critical feature of the ACA.
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Put yourself in the shoes of my kids’piano teacher. She’s got a part-time job
accompanying music students at the University of Michigan and stitches
together the rest of her modest income from teaching and performing at
church services, weddings, funerals, and the like. She doesn’t get health
coverage through the university—she only works part-time—nor is she so
poor that she can go on Medicaid.
Instead, she has to find coverage on the private market. Before the
Affordable Care Act (ACA), however, private coverage was out of reach
for her. Even without a preexisting condition, she couldn’t afford to pay
thousands of dollars for an individual health plan. She was barely scraping
by as it was.
To help people like my kids’ piano teacher, the ACA extends tax credits
to anyone earning between one and four times the poverty level who buys a
qualified health plan (26 U.S.C. x36B(c)(1)(A)), so long as the individual is
ineligible for Medicaid and doesn’t have access to employer-sponsored
coverage. The tax credits are substantial, averaging about $2,890 per
person (Levitt, Claxton, and Damico 2014). And they are an essential part
of the ACA’s effort to achieve what the statute calls ‘‘near-universal cov-
erage’’ (42 U.S.C. x 18091(2)(D)).
As Jonathan H. Adler and Michael F. Cannon read the ACA, however,
my kids’ piano teacher can’t get tax credits at all. Nor should roughly 9.5
million other people scattered throughout the country (Levitt and Claxton
2014). In their view—a view endorsed by a panel of the D.C. Circuit
(Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014))—the ACA instead
armed hostile state governments to thwart the ACA’s effort to cover the
uninsured. Their contention has assumed new urgency now that the Supreme
Court has agreed to resolve the statutory dispute in King v. Burwell.
Yet Adler and Cannon fail to offer persuasive reasons to adopt their
peculiar interpretation of the ACA. To the contrary, the government’s
alternative reading makes much better sense of the statute as a whole and
avoids assigning a meaning to the ACA that is blatantly at odds with what
the statute aims to accomplish.
The Supposed Glitch
To better organize the individual and small-group insurance markets,
section 1311 of the ACA instructs the states to establish health care
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exchanges. From the consumer’s perspective, the exchanges are just web-
sites that allow for the easy comparison of health plans sold in a particular
area. The hope is that the exchanges will enable price and quality com-
petition in an unruly insurance market.
Congress anticipated that the states would welcome the opportunity to
establish their own exchanges (Pear 2012). Better to retain state control
over health insurers than cede that authority to the federal government.
Nonetheless, Congress recognized that not every state might wish to
establish an exchange. In states that declined to do so, section 1321 of
the ACA tells the secretary of the US Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to ‘‘establish and operate’’ the state’s exchange.
As it happened, the choice of whether to establish an exchange got
caught up in the political furor over Obamacare. For the thirty-four states
that refused to establish exchanges, the federal government had to shoulder
the unexpected burden of setting up the exchanges.
In Adler and Cannon’s (2011) telling, that’s where the ACA’s supposed
‘‘glitch’’ comes in. The provision of the ACA governing the calculation of
tax credits links the amount of the credit to the price of a health plan
purchased on ‘‘an Exchange established by the State under 1311’’ (26
U.S.C. x 36B(b)(2)(A)). But what about people living in states whose
exchanges were established by the federal government? Literal adherence
to the statutory formula would suggest that subsidies aren’t available on
those exchanges. My kids’ piano teacher would be out of luck.
The Obama administration isn’t buying this interpretation of the stat-
ute. In 2012 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a rule extending
tax credits to eligible individuals, whether or not their state established
an exchange. That rule has now been challenged in four separate lawsuits.
As Adler and Cannon see it, the rule ought to be struck down because
it’s inconsistent with the ACA. If they’re right, tax credits that millions
of people now depend on to buy health insurance would evaporate.
To make their case, however, it’s not enough for Adler and Cannon
to show that it’s possible to read the ACA as withdrawing tax credits from
refusal states. If the statute is ambiguous on that point, it’s black-letter
law that the courts must defer to the IRS’s authoritative interpretation
(Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Adler
and Cannon instead have to demonstrate that the statute unambiguously
withdraws tax credits from people in refusal states—and that the IRS’s
contrary interpretation is downright unreasonable. They haven’t come close
to making such a demonstration.
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The Statutory Text
When the federal government sets up an exchange on a state’s behalf, it
does not create some sort of federal exchange. Rather, it creates a state
exchange. The text of the ACA is crisp on this point. Recall that section
1311 instructs states to establish their own exchanges. Under section 1321,
when a state fails to set up the ‘‘required Exchange’’—which is to say, a
state exchange under section 1311—the secretary of HHS must ‘‘establish
and operate such Exchange within the State’’ (my emphasis).
In other words, the backup exchange isn’t established under section
1321. It is established under section 1311, just as the provision authoriz-
ing tax credits requires. The secretary merely stands in the shoes of state
officials in setting up their states’ exchanges. Any exchange that the sec-
retary establishes is the legal and functional equivalent of a state exchange.
Adler and Cannon seem to acknowledge the force of this argument, as
did the D.C. Circuit panel that invalidated the IRS rule. They nonetheless
resist the implication that tax credits are available in states with federally
established exchanges. Their argument hinges on the claim that Congress
linked tax credits to exchanges ‘‘established by the State under 1311’’ (my
emphasis). Yes, they seem to say, a federally established exchange may be
established ‘‘under 1311.’’ But they maintain that Congress used those
three words—‘‘by the State’’—to signal that tax credits would be unavail-
able on federally established exchanges.
Reading the statute as a whole, however, it quickly becomes apparent
that Congress never meant those three words to bear the immense weight
that Adler and Cannon would assign to them. In several places in the ACA,
Congress used similar ‘‘Exchange established by the State’’ language to
refer generally to exchanges—including federally established exchanges.
If that’s so elsewhere in the statute, then why not in the provision governing
the calculation of tax credits?
Most obviously, the ACA limits who can buy insurance on an exchange
to those who ‘‘resid[e] in the State that established the Exchange’’ (42
U.S.C. x 18032(f )(1)(A)). If Adler and Cannon were correct that Congress
scrupulously distinguished between state-established exchanges and
exchanges in general, then no one in a state with a federally established
exchange could go on that exchange to buy a health plan. As the D.C.
district court put it, ‘‘The federal Exchanges would have no customers,
and no purpose’’ (Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-0623 (D.D.C. 2014)). Adler
and Cannon claim that the limitation on the exchange’s customers is
‘‘moot’’ because it appears in a provision governing state exchanges, not in
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the provision governing federally established exchanges. But federally
established exchanges are state exchanges. And Congress could not pos-
sibly have meant for those federally established exchanges to be an empty
gesture.
Elsewhere, the ACA says that states have to maintain their Medicaid
eligibility standards until ‘‘an Exchange established by the State’’ is up and
running (42 U.S.C. x 1396a(gg)(1)). This maintenance-of-effort provision
was meant to provide stopgap protection for Medicaid beneficiaries until
the exchanges went live. On Adler and Cannon’s telling, however, it would
forbid a state that declined to establish an exchange from ever relaxing its
Medicaid standards. There is zero evidence that Congress meant the ACA
to freeze state Medicaid programs into perpetuity.
Brushing past these statutory signals, Adler and Cannon aver that the
phrase ‘‘established by the State’’ appears in a number of places in the act.
But it doesn’t matter how many times Congress used the phrase. The
question is what Congress meant by the phrase. Its repetition is perfectly
consistent with the view that Congress—anticipating that nearly all the
states would establish exchanges—just meant to refer to exchanges in
general. At a minimum, Congress’s slipshod use of the ‘‘by the State’’
language gives rise to ambiguity as to what Congress meant by it. And
when there’s ambiguity about federal taxes, it’s up to the IRS to resolve that
ambiguity.
Adler and Cannon nonetheless insist that Congress meant the ‘‘by the
State’’ language in the tax-credit calculation to serve some distinct pur-
pose. What purpose do they have in mind? As they see it, Congress with-
held tax credits from states that declined to create their own exchanges in
order to goad them into establishing exchanges. Congress was making a
threat: set up your own exchanges or you’ll lose out on tax credits.
This claim is quite implausible. To begin with, Congress knows how to
threaten states with financial consequences when it wants to. Adler and
Cannon demonstrate as much by identifying a number of other bills—not
the ACA—that contain clear language conditioning federal money on
certain forms of state compliance. The absence of any such clear language
in the ACA is powerful evidence that Congress never meant the availability
of tax credits to depend on whether a state established an exchange. After
all, there was no need to bully the states into doing what everyone assumed
they would gladly do.
More to the point, threats must be communicated. When Vito Corleone
made the proverbial offer that can’t be refused, he didn’t just say ‘‘sign the
contract.’’ He had Luca Brasi hold a gun to the head of a guy and ‘‘assured
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him that either his brains or his signature would be on the contract.’’
Without the gun, there’s no threat (Bagley 2014). In the ACA, however, the
threat that Congress supposedly meant to level was so well hidden that the
states never noticed it. A careful report from the Georgetown University
Health Policy Institute, documenting what states knew and when they knew
it, has found no contemporaneous evidence that the availability of tax
credits played a role in state decisions over whether to establish exchanges
(Dash, Monahan, and Lucia 2013; Monahan 2014). How can Adler and
Cannon say that Congress unambiguously threatened the states if the states
never got the message?
Their reading is anomalous for another reason. In the absence of tax
credits on federally established exchanges, many healthy people would
forgo coverage. Those with serious health problems, however, would likely
remain in the market. The risk pools for exchange plans would become
skewed toward sicker enrollees, which would in turn increase the cost of
exchange plans. As costs went up, relatively healthy people would decline
insurance, leading to sicker risk pools and even higher prices, which would
drive away still more healthy people. In short, the exchanges would stop
working. As a just-released study from the RAND Corporation explains,
‘‘If the ACA’s subsidies are eliminated entirely, our model predicts a near
death spiral—that is, sharp premium increases and drastic enrollment
declines in the individual market’’ (Eibner and Saltzman 2014: 25). Why
construe the ACA to create dysfunctional exchanges when an alternative
reading would avoid that result?
Legislative Intent
If Congress did mean to use the three words to threaten the states, it should
be easy to find evidence of that threat in the legislative record. Yet there
is none. Adler and Cannon themselves prove the point. Over the past
few years, they’ve worked tirelessly to sift through the legislative record,
attentive for any hint that might support their preferred interpretation. Yet
they’ve found nothing.
Take, for example, the letter they discuss from the eleven Texas
Democrats in the House of Representatives. In the letter, the Democratic
legislators implored the president not to give the states the power to cre-
ate their own exchanges. ‘‘In Texas,’’ they explained, ‘‘we know from expe-
rience that the dangers to the uninsured from greater state authority are
real’’ (Doggett 2010). Better by far, the legislators argued, to establish a
national exchange—one that Texas officials couldn’t interfere with.
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Adler and Cannon assert that the legislators were voicing concerns that
Texas citizens might not get tax credits. Yet the letter says not one word
about tax credits. Not one. The absence of any mention of tax credits is the
dog that didn’t bark in the night—a clue that the legislators had no inkling
of any supposed threat. The legislators were voicing concerns about
‘‘obstruction’’ from Texas officials, not about the loss of tax credits from
the federal government. And they were right to be worried. Texas not only
declined to establish its own exchange. It also announced that it wouldn’t
enforce the ACA’s insurance rules (Luthra 2013), imposed onerous training
requirements on the navigators who help people buy insurance (Aaronson
2014), and refused to expand Medicaid (Ramshaw 2012).
What else do Adler and Cannon point to? After the ACAwas signed into
law, the House of Representatives passed the Reconciliation Act to make a
few changes. Among those changes, the House clarified that territories
were to be treated as states if they chose to establish exchanges. ‘‘It strains
credulity,’’ Adler and Cannon assert in an amicus brief they submitted to the
D.C. Circuit, ‘‘that Congress . . . would notice and remedy the bill’s failure
to authorize [tax credits] in territorial Exchanges, but would not notice its
failure to authorize them in federal Exchanges’’ (Brief of Amici Curiae
Jonathan H. Adler and Michael F. Cannon, Halbig v. Burwell, No. 14-5018
(D.C. Cir. 2014)). But it doesn’t strain credulity at all. It’s only natural
that Congress wouldn’t notice—much less assign significance to—three
innocuous words in a dense, hard-to-follow statutory formula. What is
truly inconceivable is that Congress would extend tax credits to territorial
exchanges but—without so much as a whisper—deliberately refuse to
extend them to federal exchanges.
Finally, Adler and Cannon trace the drafting history of the ACA in an
effort to support their view that Congress meant that three-word phrase,
‘‘by the State,’’ to do important work. All they demonstrate, however, is
that Congress kept using the phrase during the frantic negotiations over the
ACA. At the time, however, everyone thought that the exchanges would
be established by the states. Not a shred of evidence supports Adler
and Cannon’s conjecture that ‘‘Senate leaders and White House officials’’
engineered the insertion of the phrase in the tax-credit calculation in order
to strip tax credits from the citizens of refusal states.
I could go on. I’ve made my point, however. In poring through the
legislative history, Adler and Cannon have committed the cardinal sin of
looking over a crowd to pick out their friends. Only here, they have no
friends.
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Conclusion
Adler and Cannon have offered a strained interpretation of the ACA that,
if accepted, would make a hash of other provisions of the statute and
undermine its stated purpose of extending insurance to nearly all Ameri-
cans. The more natural reading—one that makes far better sense of the
statute as a whole—is that tax credits are available in both the states
that established exchanges and those that did not. On this view, the ‘‘by the
State’’ language just reflects Congress’s assumption, unchallenged at the
time, that the states would establish their own exchanges.
But even if you think that Adler and Cannon’s claim is plausible, maybe
even attractive, the contrary interpretation offered by the government is
at least reasonable. That brings me to the aspect of their argument that
troubles me the most: their unyielding conviction that they’ve identified
the only possible construction of the ACA. Nowhere do they so much as
acknowledge the possibility that maybe, just maybe, they’re wrong.
That’s because they can’t admit to doubt. Because of the deference extended
to agency interpretation, doubt means they lose. But their unwillingness
even to acknowledge ambiguity reflects an important difference between
legal advocacy and neutral interpretation. To be clear, Adler and Cannon
deserve immense credit for their lawyerly ingenuity: they’ve constructed
a facially plausible argument in support of an exceedingly strange inter-
pretation of the ACA. But the courts would violate their obligation of
fidelity in statutory construction if they mistook that ingenuity for genuine
obeisance to congressional will. The latest challenge to the ACA is polit-
ical activism masquerading as statutory restraint.
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